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Background: Although the number and practice 
of evaluation varies enormously among policy 
areas, there are very few studies about the unequal 
evaluation development in the different policy 
sectors.  
 
Purpose: This article aims to (1) acknowledge the 
different evaluation development among different 
policy sectors in Spain (2) identify the factors and 
causes that provoke this disproportion, and (3) 
explore potential consequences of this unequal 
distribution of evaluation studies among policy 
areas.  
 
Setting: Spain.  
 
Intervention: Public polices in Spain. 
 
Research Design: A sample of evaluations is 
classified by policy sector and the number of 
evaluations in each sector is analyzed and 
compared. Then, other significant variables are 
identified for explaining differences among 
sectors. 
  
Data Collection and Analysis: The cases 
(evaluation studies) are drawn from two samples: 
(1) a data base of evaluation studies and (2) a 
survey to Spanish evaluators held in 2009. The 
comparison was done with difference in 
proportions, adjusted standardised residuals and 
crosstabs.  
 
Findings: Analysis of Spanish evaluations shows 
that program evaluations are much more frequent 
in the social policies’ area than in the areas of 
security, defense or justice. A variable with a high 
ability to predict whether or not evaluations will be 
carried out is identified: the selective versus 
universal nature of the policies being evaluated. 
Selective interventions are more frequently 
evaluated than universal policies. This lack of 
balance makes selective interventions more prone 
to severe critical analysis. This evaluation bias, in 
turn, produces a series of perverse effects such as a 
greater probability of cutting down programs 
based on selective application strategies.  
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here is still much work to be done in 
Spain in the field of evaluation. This is 
easily explained looking at its slow 
evolution since its early steps. 
It is not until the 1980s and 1990s that 
we can find a substantial body of work 
written in Spanish (either original or 
translated), even though there was very 
interesting work on evaluation published 
before. During these two decades in 
Spain, there were different public 
institutions whose functions included 
evaluation. However, this work was not 
substantial enough to create a 
T
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comprehensive culture that would spread 
to other institutions. In 2002, The 
International Atlas of Evaluation (Furubo 
et al.) placed Spain in the lowest rank of 
the 21 countries under study. 
It was not until the turn of the century 
that evaluation took off in Spain with a 
steady pace (Pazos & Zapico-Goñi, 2002; 
Bustelo 2006; Fernandez-Ramírez & 
Rebolloso, 2006). Some of the signs of 
this growth are:  
 
 In the year 2001 the Spanish 
Evaluation Society is created to 
foster the development of 
evaluation culture.  
 A supply of specific graduate and 
post-graduate training appears. 
Evaluation courses are offered 
within different undergraduate 
degrees. There are several 
postgraduate Master’s degrees, the 
first was offered in 2002.  
 Also in this year, the National 
Agency for Quality Assessment and 
Accreditation (ANECA) was set up. 
In 2004 a Commission was also 
created to build the Agency for 
Evaluation (National Agency for 
the Evaluation of Policies and 
Quality of Services) founded later 
in 2007. These initiatives evidence 
the presence of a political will 
supporting and endorsing the 
stronger development of 
Evaluation in Spain.  
 A significant growth in the 
production of papers, theses and 
books on the subject, although it is 
still meager.  
 The above mentioned and other 
factors have contributed to the 
emergence of an incipient 
professional market (III Seminar 
on Evaluation Experiences for 
Programmes and Policies, 2006).1 
 
The development of this discipline is 
no doubt satisfactory. The improvements 
which evaluation seems to bring to public 
action will no doubt be beneficial for the 
general welfare. However, although we are 
still in the early days, it is worth 
questioning whether evaluation is 
developing adequately. 
A possible deficiency in the way in 
which the professional field is taking 
shape is the fact that certain public policy 
sectors are subjected to evaluation more 
often than others. This unequal 
application of evaluation would have 
consequences on the development of 
policies themselves and, therefore, on the 
target populations, point I make on in this 
paper. The question that arises is whether 
the same effort is invested in evaluating 
the actions of the different sectors of 
public intervention. 
In Spanish literature there are good, 
well supported articles on the state of the 
evaluation issue, meta-evaluation projects 
and case studies2 but there are no studies 
                                                
1 Entitled “Professional Development: Emerging 
Fields in Evaluation” held in the Centre for 
Management Studies of the Complutense 
University of Madrid on June 1st 2006. 
2 Amongst the possible references it is worth 
highlighting the following as an example: the 
chapter by Pazos and Zapico (2002) for the 
International Atlas of Evaluation, the Commission 
report for the Study and creation of the National 
Agency for the Evaluation of Public Policies and 
Quality of Services (AEVAL) (2004), the paper by 
Fernández and Rebolloso referred to above, the 
article by Bustelo (2006) on the development of an 
evaluation culture, the issue by Garde on the 
institutionalisation of evaluation in Spain (2006), 
the document for the European Commission by 
Bustelo et al (2006) and the article by Díaz-
Puente, Cazorla and Borrego (2007) in which they 
analyse international evaluation journals and 
present data for Spain. Metaevaluations or case 
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examining the incidence of evaluation 
broken down by political sector. Despite 
the fact that research on evaluation has 
increased substantially over the last years 
still “we lack systematic studies describing 
the varied and little known Spanish 
reality” (Fernandez- Ramírez & Rebolloso, 
2006, p. 135). 
Taking into account local studies only, 
it is impossible to know what the level of 
evaluation development by sectors is. It is 
necessary to use other approaches of 
investigation in order to reply to the 
question. The following section describes 




In an article about evaluation activities in 
Europe, Leeuw, Toulemonde and 
Brouwers (1999) suggest certain ways of 
monitoring growth (or decline) of 
evaluation activities, such as interviews, 
taking stock of evaluation reports, 
bibliometrics and indirect evidence. In 
their case they choose a survey carried out 
with evaluation service providers, both in 
the private and the academic sectors. 
Other significant studies (although 
already old) on evaluation by political 
sectors have obtained information 
through an evaluation sample. This is the 
case of the work by Nioche and Poinsard 
(1984) in France, with 269 evaluations. 
Another example is the analysis of 
contracts offered by the United States 
administration, such as the ¨Request for 
Proposal¨ study included in Freeman and 
Solomon (1981). 
                                                                           
studies include the work by García Sánchez (2005) 
on educational reform, Bustelo (2004) on gender 
equality policies and Díaz-Puente, Yagüe and 
Alfonso (2008) on European structural funds, 
which present information on their own sector 
alone. 
Amongst the different strategies that 
have been identified for the present essay, 
two evaluation samples have been 
selected for analysis. One of them is made 
up of the information presented in 
evaluation congresses and seminars held 
in Spain and the other is the result of a 
self-completion survey carried out on 
evaluators. 
The other options were more complex 
and difficult to put into practice. In Spain 
there is no obligation or reason to 
motivate communicating evaluation 
assignments to any register or data base, 
which do not exist anyway. If these 
registers actually existed, as Leeuw et al. 
(1999) state, given the large number of 
evaluation instances, they could very well 
become unmanageable. On the other 
hand, bibliometric studies on evaluations 
in the Spanish context are not very 
reliable, as there are no specialized 
publications or a shared and extended 
tradition amongst the different 
institutions of publishing their reports or 
passing them on to documentation 
centers. The two samples used are 
described below. 
 
Study of the Evaluation Database  
 
The Master on Evaluation of Public 
Programmes and Policies of the 
Complutense University of Madrid has 
compiled an evaluation data base in order 
to provide students, academics and 
professionals with references. All the 
evaluations that had been presented or 
mentioned in different specialized 
evaluation forums between 2001 and May 
20093 were identified, classified and 
                                                
3 Presentations in evaluation congresses or 
seminars: I, II, III, IV, V Seminar on Evaluation 
Experiences, UCM (2004, 2005, 2006,2007 and 
2008);IV, V Congress of the Spanish Evaluation 
Society (2005, 2009);VIII Spanish Congress of 
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included in a data base. Evaluations of 
several seminars on drug prevention were 
also included. Finally, Master’s theses 
were also included whenever the authors 
gave their authorization. 
The evaluation base has been used to 
learn about the distribution of evaluations 
according to sectors. Only the evaluations 
carried out in Spain or financed with 
Spanish money have been selected. As this 
is not a census or a random sample and 
given that the base has been compiled 
with educational purposes it may be 
biased in different ways. At least three 
possible biases have been identified: 
 
1. A large number of drug prevention 
evaluations in comparison to other 
intervention sectors were found in 
the database. The question is if this 
increased volume of drug program 
evaluations is a true reflection of an 
increase in demand for this 
particular kind of evaluation or a 
result of the master’s emphasis on 
prevention programs. Database 
analyses were carried out both with 
and without evaluations of 
prevention programs in order to 
compare results. The outcome was 
more flattering when the 
evaluations of prevention programs 
were included. Consequently, the 
decision was made to exclude them 
in order to conduct our study in the 
most unfavourable context. It has 
to be noted, however, that its 
exclusion from the final tally might 
also be a form of bias. The final 
                                                                           
Sociology. Evaluation of Social Intervention 
Programmes. Methodology Working Group 
(2004);Dissertations for the Master on Evaluation 
of Public Programmes and Policies, UCM (2003, 
2004, 2005,2006, 2007,2008). 
data base includes 159 
evaluations4. 
2. As only specific evaluation forums 
are taken into account, and given 
that in Spain they are usually 
related to the fields of sociology, 
psychology, economy, political 
science and administration, the 
most evaluated sectors may be 
those closest to these disciplines. 
3. Some sectors may be less inclined 
to presenting their results in public 
for different reasons, such as the 
need to preserve the information 
(home security, defense...), threats 
to program continuity or lack of 
incentives to communicate the 
information. Therefore, sectors 
more influenced by these possible 
factors can have less presence in 
the data base. 
 
To summarize, first of all, the results 
obtained from this data base will not be 
representative of the drug prevention 
sector. Secondly, evaluations in the fields 
of social sciences, psychology and politics 
may be overrepresented. Thirdly, in as far 
as confidentiality may act in detriment of 
evaluations, sectors with a greater 
involvement in security issues or working 
with sensitive or strategic information for 
the State may be underrepresented. 
 
Self-Completion Survey of 
Evaluators 
 
Bustelo and Fitzpatrick carried out 
throughout 2009 the fieldwork for the 
research project titled “Evaluation in 
                                                
4 The “Evaluaciones” data base is available at 
www.magisterevaluacion.es. 
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Spain: Practice and Institutionalization”5. 
The results were presented in the Annual 
AEA Conference: Evaluation 2009: 
Context and Evaluation, Orlando, Florida 
held between November 11th-14th, 2009. 
The authors designed a self-completion 
questionnaire to be filled in online on key 
aspects of Spanish evaluation. At one 
point, the questionnaire requested that 
the participant name the last evaluation 
carried out or any other that they 
considered important and then went on to 
ask a battery of questions about that 
evaluation. 
The questionnaire was sent to 356 
people who carry out evaluations and 
which are included in a data base 
administered by the Master on Evaluation 
of Programmes. Members of the Spanish 
Evaluation Society were also invited to 
reply to the questionnaire. These contacts 
generated 150 filled in questionnaires. 
This sample has been used in order to find 
out the distribution of evaluation by 
sectors. 
Several biases have been identified in 
this sample: 
 
1. The total sample of evaluators in 
Spain is unknown, there are bound 
to be people working in evaluation 
who are not included in the 
aforementioned data base or who 
do not belong to the Spanish 
Evaluation Society and who will 
not have received the 
questionnaire. 
2. Self-completion surveys are biased 
by the fact that those who respond 
represent the more motivated 
subjects. 
                                                
5 I am extremely grateful to María Bustelo and 
Jody Fitzpatrick for allowing me the use of one of 
the items’ survey results before its publishing.  
3. The respondent chooses according 
to their own criterion the 
evaluation that they will describe. 
 
The same analysis has been carried out 
on both samples, the one obtained from 
the evaluation base and the one obtained 
from the self-completion survey. A team6 
classified the evaluated programs 
according to the sector that the evaluation 
referred to (the program, policy or service 
under evaluation). It was decided to 
classify them according to areas or 
ministry sectors, as this is a well-known, 
convenient and intuitive scheme to 
organize public affairs, and we used the 
current Spanish model with some 
corrections7: Culture; Defense; Economy; 
Education and Sport; Employment and 
Immigration; Environment, Agriculture 
and Fisheries; Equality; Foreign Affairs 
and Development Cooperation; Health; 
Housing; Industry, Tourism and 
Commerce; Infrastructures; Justice; 
Home Affairs; Presidency; Public 
Administration; Science and Technology 




The frequency distribution of the two 
samples is shown in Figure 1. 
                                                
6 The classification of the evaluated programs was 
carried out by the coordinators of the Master on 
Evaluation Belén Rodríguez, Irene Rosales, Isabel 
Morandeira and Maruxa Fernández and by Juan 
Andrés Ligero.  
7 Social Services and Health have been separated. 
Public Administration has been introduced and 
territorial policy has not been included. “Fomento” 
(public works) has been translated as 
Infrastructures, given that this is one of the main 
activities of the department.  
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Figure 1. Frequency Distribution of Samples 
 
 
The first conclusion that can be 
extracted from the graph is the fact that, 
basically, the two samples have a similar 
distribution8 amongst sectors except for 
the category of Health, which shows a 
different behavior. 
The second conclusion is that there is 
not the same volume of evaluations in the 
different sectors. Some sectors are 
subjected to a lot of evaluation, such as, 
for example, Foreign Affairs and 
Development Cooperation, Employment 
and Immigration, Equality and Social 
Services (there are discrepancies in 
Health). Other sectors, such as Defense, 
Justice, Infrastructures, Home Affairs, 
Housing or Economy are less evaluated or 
even not evaluated at all. This is the case 
                                                
8 The adjusted standardised residuals were 
analysed and they showed that there are no 
statistically significant differences between the 
pairs of categories in either sample, with the only 
exception of Health, where differences do appear. 
 
of Defense, which does not even appear in 
the graph. 
The absence of evaluation in certain 
sectors can be ascribable to the need for 
confidentiality in their policies. This could 
be the case of Defense, Home Affairs or 
Justice. However, this does not apply to 
other sectors such as Housing, Economy 
or Infrastructures, which require other 
possible explanations. 
On the other hand, the trend that the 
data show is familiar. Following Leeuw et 
al’s suggestion to use indirect evidence, 
Spanish bibliography generally provides 
more examples and references of 
evaluations on social intervention, drugs, 
health, education, gender and 
employment than on other sectors. This 
may also be the case in the bibliography 
for other countries. In the case of the 
USA, it is more usual to find references to 
social or educational programs than to 
other areas. Carol Weiss even states that 
some of such fields, such as education, 
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poverty or crime prevention, have been 
key in developing the discipline of 
evaluation (1998:12). 
All in all, the data from both samples 
show consistent and significant 
differences in the volume of evaluations 
according to sectors, the issue now is to 
find out why there is this disparity and 
whether this is in fact a feature of 




Amongst the different factors9 which have 
been considered as possible explanations, 
there is a variable which partially explains 
the disparity in the number of evaluations, 
and it has a bearing on the behavior of 
political decision makers when 
commissioning evaluations. This variable 
has been called “universal or selective 
nature of interventions.”  
 
Universal and Selective 
Interventions 
 
Universal policies or programs are those 
interventions which aim to benefit the 
whole of the population equally in a 
certain field. Examples include the public 
health system, public infrastructures, 
traffic management, and police services or 
national defense policies. 
                                                
9 One of the analysed factors was budget size by 
public sectors. The Spanish public budget shows 
that the frequencies shown in Figure 1 have no 
relationship with the budgets assigned to each 
area. For example, the areas receiving the largest 
proportion of the budget are Employment and 
Immigration, Economy, Infrastructures, Defence 
and Home Affairs. With the exception of 
Employment, there are hardly any evaluations for 
these areas in the samples. However, this can not 
be considered evidence, as the evaluation samples 
correspond to different administrations and 
periods while the public budgets are those for 
2009. 
Selective or positive discrimination 
policies favor a certain social segment or 
group which differs from the rest because 
they share a certain characteristic or 
demographic, social or cultural condition. 
They are based on the fact that not all the 
citizenship enjoys the same options or 
shares the same difficulties. Subsequently, 
actions are required to give the 
disadvantaged more opportunities. 
Amongst the possible examples, there are 
literacy programs for adults, insertion 
programs for minorities, rehousing of 
shanty-dwellers or programs for 
minimum-income citizens. 
Observing the data in Figure 1, it 
seems that selective policies undergo 
more evaluation than universal policies, 
regardless of the political sector in which 
the interventions are framed. This 
hypothesis was tested with both 
evaluation samples. 
The evaluations in the samples were 
classified again according to their 
universal or selective nature. In this 
process, doubts emerged regarding some 
cases such as schools and some rural and 
local development interventions. In the 
case of the compulsory educational 
system, the whole population of a certain 
age must be enrolled in compulsory 
education, so it has been considered of 
universal nature, although it could also be 
considered a selective intervention. In the 
case of rural development projects, there 
were doubts about the actual 
characteristics of the interventions, and 
so, they were excluded from the analysis. 
The samples were reduced to 138 in the 
case of the data base and 122 in the case of 
the self-completed survey. 
The samples were analyzed with a 
frequency distribution and the differences 
in “d” proportions were extracted as 
shown in table 1. 
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Differences in Proportions of Number of Evaluations Between Universal and Selective 
Evaluated Programs 
 








Difference in “d” 
proportions 
N 
Evaluation data base 31.4 % 68.6% -37.2% 138 
Evaluator survey 28.7% 64.8% -36.1% 122 
 
 
The two samples show a very similar 
behavior. The data shows that between 
68.8% and 64.8% of the evaluations under 
study have been carried out on selective 
programs and between 31.4% and 28.7% 
have been carried out on universal 
interventions. The difference between 
them is about 36% or 37%. In other 
words, for every universal intervention 
evaluated, there are approximately 2.2 
selective intervention evaluated. 
The variable “universal or selective 
nature of the interventions” partly 
explains the disparity in evaluations found 
between the different sectors. If these two 
variables, “universal-selective” and 
“political sector”, are crossed, a high 
association emerges between the two in 
both samples. These adjusted 
standardized residuals have also been 
cross-tabulated in order to see the 
association for each of the categories, the 
results have been summarized in the 
tables below10. 
                                                
10 The adjusted standardized residuals have been 
cross-tabulated. The chi-square test applied to the 
evaluation data base and the evaluator survey 
results in a significance level of p = 0.00. The 
variable categories have been classified according 
to whether or not they obtained a remainder over 
1.96. Cases with values between -1.96 and +1.96 
have been classified in the “Equal” category, 
Table 2 
Political Sectors by Universal or Selective 






















































                                                                           
considering that there were no significant 
differences. 
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Political Sectors by Universal or Selective 
















































The sectors which emerged as the most 
subjected to evaluation in Figure 1 are 
classified in both samples or in one of 
them as those which include more 
selective intervention strategies than 
expected. There are two sectors which do 
not fit this pattern. Health, which already 
presented differences between the data 
obtained from the two samples, does not 
show a significant difference between one 
strategy or the other. The other case is 
Education, which is the fifth most 
                                                
11 The residual is 1.9, although very close to 1.96, it 
was decided classify it in the equal category. 
evaluated sector and is classified in one of 
the samples as universal12. 
On the other end of the spectrum, the 
least evaluated areas, such as 
Infrastructures, Home Affairs, Housing or 
Economy, are classified in both samples 
or in one of them as employing universal 
strategies. Justice only appears in one of 
the samples and does not show a clear 
trend and there is no information on 
Defense. 
Taking into account these exceptions, 
there is a trend showing that the most 
evaluated sectors are those which base 
their policies more on selective strategies 
and, on the other hand, the least 
evaluated sectors are those whose policies 
are based more on universal strategies. 
All in all, the conclusions that can be 
extracted from the whole analysis is that 
policies of a selective nature are more 
subjected to evaluation than universal 
policies (2.2 selective policies to one 
universal policy) and this affects the 
unequal distribution of evaluations by 
sectors, as certain sectors tend to favor 
one type of intervention strategy over the 
other. 
Therefore, some aspect of selective 
intervention strategies must encourage 
evaluations or, on the other hand, 
universal strategies may imply a process 
which discourages evaluation. This is the 




The existence of trends which make some 
programs more evaluated than others is 
something that has already been 
described in evaluation bibliography. 
Carol Weiss explains that “In the 1960s 
                                                
12 This category generated doubts as to where to 
classify school system evaluations. They were 
finally classified as universal.  
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and 1970s it was the new and innovative 
program that was evaluated. The hardy 
perennials went on without cavil or 
question, whether o not they were doing 
much good. And since the new programs 
of the period were programs for marginal 
groups, such as poor children, juvenile 
delinquents, and released mental patients, 
these were the programs that were 
scrutinized” (1991, p. 222). 
Another example is that of tax 
expenditure programs in the USA, “unlike 
most direct expenditure programs, most 
tax expenditures are open-ended in terms 
of the amounts involved, they are not 
subject to annual competitive 
appropriations, they are permanently 
authorized, and, until recently, their 
effectiveness rarely has been evaluated” 
(Datto & Grasso, 1998, p. 1). Besides, the 
authors find that tax expenditure 
programs, at all levels (federal, state and 
local) “tend to benefit the wealthier, and 
direct expenditures tend to benefit the 
poorer”. 
In both cases, the most evaluated 
interventions are aimed at populations in 
difficult conditions or situations. Weiss 
explains that, partly, this is due to the fact 
that “programs with powerless clientele 
may lack the coalition of support that 
shields more mainstream groups. They 
may not have developed alliances of 
interest groups, professional associations, 
citizen representatives, and bureaucrats 
that will seek to reduce the intrusion of 
evaluation” (1991, p. 222). 
There are certain similarities between 
what these authors explain and what this 
article puts forward with regards the 
Spanish case. According to the quoted 
references, the programs which are more 
prone to undergo evaluation are those 
which are aimed at the less wealthy 
population, marginal groups or the 
powerless. By definition, these programs 
only intervene in a certain section of 
society, which would classify them as 
selective policies. 
The explanation which this article 
expounds is that universal and selective 
policies generate different reactions and, 
therefore, different evaluation demands 
from the whole of society, but also from 
the policy makers that commission the 
evaluation. 
The fact that not everybody can benefit 
from a program or a public service may 
provoke wariness: if I have the same 
rights as everybody else, then why can’t I 
benefit from this integration benefit, that 
rehousing flat or those training courses? 
The concern expressed is more than a 
simple theoretical doubt. It relates to the 
suspicion that the policy in question may 
be unfair and that the technical criterion 
behind the selection process may be 
arbitrary. There is mistrust that the 
person benefiting from public money may 
not fulfill the established requirements. 
Mistrust may be so great that, 
sometimes, concern with “fraud” displaces 
the very aims of the policies and becomes 
its main objective. For example, in certain 
minimum income programs, the control 
system is so strict and bureaucratic that it 
consumes more resources than it should, 
hindering the achievement of the main 
aims13. 
The doubt about the truthfulness of 
the beneficiary’s condition is not anything 
new, neither does it respond to greater 
political technicalities. In the case of 
policies to combat poverty, the same 
concern can be found at least since the 
18th Century. At that time great 
                                                
13 There are exceptions to this logic and some 
decision makers understand that certain “fraud” 
percentages have to be taken into account (the 
estimation is about 5%) in order to avoid excessive 
bureaucracy and costs. 
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consideration was already given to 
distinguishing between the “real poor” 
and the “fake poor”, regardless of the fact 
that all of them lived on the streets, 
begged and shared the same life 
conditions. Before giving any money or 
goods to a beggar, it was necessary to 
settle whether the person had really been 
thrown into precariousness or whether, 
on the contrary, they were able to work 
but did not want to: 
 
The reform of social assistance demanded, 
beforehand, that false beggars be 
unmasked, only in this way could every 
city support its own poor people: if there 
was some irrefutable way of establishing 
in each case whether it was real or feigned 
poverty. In consequence, the aim of many 
of the acts involved with this issue will be 
to show false beggars up, that is, all those 
who could work if they wanted to, in order 
to dedicate existing resources to assist and 
take care of the “real” poor people, that is, 
“those who can not earn their living” and 
“must [sic] really beg.” (Cabrera, 1998,p. 
30). 
 
Updating the terms, the same concern 
appears in contemporary programs 
dealing with unemployment benefits, 
rehousing or home care, amongst others. 
What is actually behind this distinction is 
the persistent doubt and suspicion of 
fraud that seem to accompany programs 
granting goods and services to only a 
portion of the population. 
These reactions become even more 
extreme when social and personal 
difficulties are not so obvious. Examples 
can include the social development 
problems of “immigration children”, lower 
social classes or inequality between men 
and women generated by the gender 
system14. These cases sometimes provoke 
                                                
14 System of gender means: “Just like every society 
has its system of production, there is also a gender 
system, which is the aspect in social life which 
vehement reactions and arguments which 
even deny the existence of differences or, 
if they are recognized, defend not 
investing public money in readdressing 
these imbalances. 
Although this interpretation is focused 
on the Spanish case, similar reactions to 
positive discrimination can be found in 
other countries. In the USA social unrest 
about positive actions can reach such a 
degree that this kind of laws has even 
been banned in certain places. In 2006 at 
Michigan there was a public consultation 
through referendum about the legality of 
this type of strategies. 58% voted against 
their use and, as a result, the use by public 
institutions of positive discrimination 
programs “based on race, gender, 
ethnicity or national origin” has been 
declared illegal. (Holusha, 2006). Some 
months later, the United States Supreme 
Court declared the positive discrimination 
policy aimed to promote racial integration 
in schools unconstitutional (Monge, 
2007). 
Reflecting upon opportunities and 
about the efficiency of positive 
discrimination does not seem to be the 
issue at hand. What concerns people is the 
strategy, how it is done, regardless of how 
satisfactory results may be and how much 
they may contribute to reducing social 
inequalities. On the other hand, universal 
policies do not raise that legislative zeal, 
even if they deepen and broaden the 
difficulties they were intended to 
eradicate. 
Evaluation is a useful and legitimate 
tool to find out more about public 
intervention and to account to the 
citizenship for its performance. However, 
the evaluation system is not neutral and, 
                                                                           
organises relationships between men and women” 
(Britt-Marie Thuren, 1993,p. 97).  
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as House states, evaluation can be 
politically driven (2006).  
Commissioning an evaluation can also 
be politically driven, and is part of the 
political influence game. Patrizi and 
McMulla (Henry, 1998) found out as a 
result of their survey carried out on 
leaders of foundations that one of the 
main priorities to finance evaluations is 
the influence they have on public policy. 
In this sense, Weiss understands that “a 
political statement is implicit in the 
selection of some programs to undergo 
evaluation and others to escape scrutiny 
and Chelimsky considers that in some 
cases “study questions may hide a 
partisan or ideological purpose” (1998, p. 
404).  
Therefore, it is likely that more 
evaluations are commissioned in cases in 
which it is interesting, motivating, 
convenient and necessary to refute or 
confirm the efficiency of the program in 
front of the decision-making social actors. 
Thus, it is not strange that in this context 
evaluation is used to analyze those 
policies that generate most concern. 
In practice, if a certain intervention 
does not raise doubts or questioning, it is 
likely that the actors will not demand any 
evaluation, unless it is requested by other 
instances. Therefore, if selective actions 
generate concern, they are more likely to 
call for more evaluations than policies of a 
universal nature, which do not inspire the 
same kind of suspicion. 
The paradox in this situation derives 
from the coexistence of unevaluated 
universal interventions worth millions 
and more humble selective programs 
which are evaluated time and time again. 
In Spain costly projects such as dual 
carriageways in areas of low traffic 
density, tunnels, burying roads, frequent 
refurbishment of urban furnishings and 
landscape, state subsidies for car 
purchases, various public TV and radio 
stations, institutional presence in cultural 
events or construction of large 
emblematic buildings are not only not 
evaluated (except for auditing and 
accounting controls) but neither is there 
any manifest public demand requesting 
that they are. Nothing is known about 
their results, appropriateness, 
prioritization of social needs or about the 
opportunity cost of such investments.  
On the other hand, certain plans and 
programs such as those aimed at people 
with minimum incomes, dependent 
people, prostitutes, unemployed people, 
training for certain collectives, social 
reinsertion or subsidies for artistic 
creation, regardless of their cost, tend to 
be under greater evaluative pressure. 
In any case, evaluation should not be a 
punishment, as having evaluations is good 
news. In theory, their constructive effects 
should be felt in the form of more 
sensitive and responsible actions by 
professionals and decision makers. 
According to this view, it is policies of a 
universal nature that suffer, because they 
do not benefit from the feedback provided 
by evaluation like the others do. However, 
despite the fact that in absolute terms, 
systematic evaluation is profitable, there 
are certain risks in the unequal 





An evaluation exercise must be based on 
the possibility that the assessment may be 
negative. Therefore, the more evaluated 
programs are more exposed to this type of 
judgment than programs which are not 
evaluated. Using Weiss’s words “the 
evaluated program has all its linen, clean 
and dirty, hung out in public, the 
unanalyzed program can tuck its secrets 
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away in the bureau drawers” (1991, p. 
221). 
When negative results are hung out for 
the public to see it is easier for the next 
step to be restriction, denial of funds or 
closure of the program. There are many 
examples of this. In the European 
Commission, the Evaluation Unit in the 
Directorate General for Budget argues in 
favor of the usefulness of evaluation 
processes by pointing out that they served 
to argue in favor of closing down a school-
breakfast program (School Milk 
Measure)15. In the USA, when Ronald 
Reagan “took office his agenda was to 
curtail government, and evaluators were 
asked to find inefficiencies” (House, 2006, 
p. 120). G.W Bush announced that he 
would cut down or eliminate over 150 
government programs that were not 
getting results. As Bush warned, those 
programs that cannot be held to account 
for good performance will be reduced or 
eliminated (Renger, 2006).  
This is not to speak against the closure 
or cutting down of programs which are 
not working, but to point out that a 
greater exposition to public analysis 
renders selective policies more vulnerable. 
Meanwhile, universal policies, which are 
less evaluated, stand apart from these 
dynamics without being questioned. 
Going back to examples from the USA, 
Monnier (1992) explains how evaluation 
was used by the Nixon administration to 
put off the execution of social measures 
imposed by Congress and cut down the 
number of innovative social programs. 
In the face of these situations, it is not 
strange that the reactions to evaluation 
                                                
15 Case quoted by Eduardo Zapico in his paper on 
the Evaluation in the European Commission in the 
VI Seminar on Evaluation Experiences. Master on 
Evaluation of Public Programmes and Policies of 
the Complutense University of Madrid, 28/09/09. 
 
are avoidance and armor plating 
whenever the decision makers behind 
these interventions think that the 
outcome of evaluation will not be positive 
(Newcomer, 2004). The phenomenon 
detected by Chelimsky relates to this. 
Between 1980 and 1994 the author 
perceived an increase in “secrecy and 
classification” regarding information in a 
large number of agencies. “The irony is 
that the threat to validity posed by 
classification often has little to do with 
national security but rather with the dark 
side of agency independence (2008, p. 
407). 
Just like certain evaluation methods 
may have perverse effects (Leeuw & 
Furubo, 2008), the same is true of the 
unequal spread of evaluation, which can 
have a penalizing effect on certain 
policies. 
Taking into account the current 
situation of evaluation in Spain, the risk is 
that selective public actions or those 
based on positive discrimination may be 
penalized as a result of being more 
exposed. The consolidation of this 
dynamic could contribute in the long run 
to shape a certain political conception 
which, supported by a technical discourse, 
would promote linear interventions in 
which everybody receives the same, 
regardless of the difficulties or social 
needs they may suffer. 
Besides, the relationship between 
strategies (universal and selective) and 
political sectors, the fact that Justice, 
Infrastructures or Defense tend to act by 
means of universal strategies whereas 
Social Affairs, Labor, Immigration and 
Equality need to selectively address 
specific groups implies, indirectly, that the 
latter political sectors, associated with 
social welfare policies, suffer a detriment. 
The effect of evaluation, as it stands, 
seems to contribute to a technocratic State 
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model. Strong in Justice, Defense, Interior 
and Infrastructures but weak and 
undercapitalized in the social field. In this 
kind of State, if intervention on a specific 
collective is considered technically 
indispensable, it will probably be 
undertaken in a limited, restricted and 
“scrutinized” fashion with the help of 
various mechanisms including evaluation. 
 
Concluding Remarks  
 
Although the final conclusions of the 
article suggest that it may be possible to 
generalize them to other realities, it is 
necessary to support this hypothesis with 
specific data in order to find out whether 
this is also true of other countries. There 
are indications that seem to point in this 
direction. The studies by Leeuw et al, 
Nioche and Poinsard and the Request for 
Proposal show at first sight similar trends 
to those found in the Spanish case. 
The first recommendation is an 
invitation to researchers to analyze 
samples, evaluation data bases, registers 
or evaluation requests in different 
countries in order to find out whether 
similar processes are taking place. 
The second recommendation implies 
investing some efforts in correcting the 
current uneven application of evaluation. 
The identification of some perverse effect 
should not result in less evaluations being 
requested. On the other hand, it is 
necessary to increase the domain of 
evaluation so that all policies, both 
universal and selective undergo the same 
feedback and learning process. 
Establishing a monitoring system for 
the spread of evaluation in the different 
political sectors. The monitoring system 
can be based on periodic sampling of 
evaluations taking the different 
administrative units as population for 
research on evaluation contracts offered 
by the different administrations or in 
bibliometric studies according to the 
suggestion by Leeuw et al mentioned 
above. This monitoring function could be 
taken up by general governmental units or 
bodies in charge of evaluation policies. In 
the case of Spain, a clear role might be 
played by the National Agency for 
Evaluation (AEVAL) or similar regional 
government bodies. 
The monitoring model may raise alarm 
if there are sectors which are rarely 
evaluated. General bodies, like the AEVAL 
in Spain may lead evaluation processes in 
such sectors or encourage them by calling 
the attention of the actors in charge of 
evaluation in each political sector. 
The choice of what is to be evaluated 
must be made by making the decision 
criteria explicit. This motivation can be 
included in the commission or the terms 
of reference. 
In order to avoid some of the perverse 
effects, the commission can establish 
certain recommendations in the 
evaluation contract. The following aspects 
might be recommended in their terms of 
reference: 
 
 Evaluations must contemplate an 
analysis of the context. 
 The results must be examined in 
relation to other evaluations in 
order to prevent them from leading 
to negative judgment without 
evidence from the theoretical and 
practical context. 
 A careful and, as Weiss advises 
(1991), critical view point must be 
applied to the standards upon 
which the judgment rests. If 
evaluation is carried out according 
to models with standards, the 
choice of these standards must be 
justified. On the other hand, the 
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quality of a certain intervention can 
not rest solely upon its outcomes 
(Greene, 1999). In order to 
contextualize and understand the 
results it must also be possible to 
obtain information about processes 
and structural elements. 
 
In countries where the evaluation is in 
an emerging phase, like in Spain, it is 
particularly important that evaluation is 
not seen as an enemy but, in association 
with a constructive methodology, as help 
rather than control. There might be two 
recommendations in this sense: 
 
1. Rewarding organizations which are 
capable of engaging in the 
transparency implied by evaluation 
and of applying the resulting 
recommendations regardless of 
whether the results are positive or 
negative. This is particularly 
important for NGOs or 
organizations which depend on 
subsidies. Organizations which 
commission evaluations such as the 
Spanish Agency for International 
Development Cooperation (AECID) 
can include in their commissions 
the commitment not to penalize 
organizations which open 
themselves up to evaluation. 
2. Making subsidies or donations 
conditional upon evaluations being 
completed. In the case of 
organizations which are recurrently 
not evaluated, the granting of 
subsidies or donations must be put 
to question. This measure is 
applicable to all intervention 
sectors, but particularly to those 
which have not developed 
evaluation as much, such as 
Defense, Justice, Infrastructures, 
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